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RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT? Notes Toward An Operational Approach 
By Reginald Herbold Green
Words mean what I say they mean.
Alice in Wonderland 
(The Red Queen)
Aye, but a man's reach must exceed his grasp 
or what's a heaven for?
- W. B. Browning
This is the way the world ends 
Not with a bang, but with a whimper.
- T. S. Eliot
Do not go silent into that good night,
But rage, rage against the dying of the light.
Dylan Thomas
Toward Definitional Ground Clearing (Synthesis?)
Discussion of the right to development has regularly become embrangled 
in attempts to create a series of rather unreal dichotomies between 
traditional political human rights and subsequently articulated socio 
and politico economic rights. This pseudo cartesian (or pseudo dialectic) 
approach tends to obscure a great deal more than it reveals; except 
perhaps about some of the participants in the debates. Its origins - and 
much of its rhetoric - flow narrowly from the Cold War and more broadly 
from entrenched versus excluded individual, community and sub-class interests.
Individual rights cannot in general be separated either from communal 
rights or from a social context. A Lockeian social contract and a 
parliamentary democracy both posit a social context and a right of communities 
(or at least majorities grouping individuals) to decide as necessary 
prerequisites for individual rights to vote or to stand for election.
Similarly the right to freedom from hunger or to an adequate diet (most 
rights can be formulated either positively or negatively) is usually seen 
as collective but in practice necessarily involves actual individuals' 
access to actual food.
Absolute or conditional is a distinction which may have some validity albeit 
the absolutes are mostly negative eg freedom from torture (including 
perhaps freedom from starvation?). But most rights are conditional eg freedom 
of speech is conditioned by "clear and present danger” doctrines both in 
respect to shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre and "Carib-Paki bastards go
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home” in Brixton. The arguments turn on what rights should be conditioned 
to what degree to protect what other rights. There is no very evident 
correllation with whether the right is "traditional” (eg freedom of speech) 
or socio political (eg to enjoy the fruits of ones labour). If either 
is employed in a way leading to a clear and present danger to the rights 
of others then a case for limitations arises.
Costless versus costly is a recent - and singularly unfortunate - dichotomy. 
Freedom of speech, or organisation, or ability to remove officials by 
majority (community) decision would not be costless to the rulers of 
Poland or the Philippines, occupied Kampuchea or Zaire, Afghanistan or 
El Salvador. It would cost them their power in each case and for many 
their lives in several. (Indeed in these cases accepting and acting on 
a right of freedom from malnutrition would be less costly.) It is rare 
that those denying the validity - or simply refusing to allow the enjoyment - 
of a right perceive it to be costless. Iddi Amin did not view torture 
as a pastime but as a means to consolidate and maintain power nor kill 
those who spoke of talking tortoises from petty irritation but because by 
calling up a well known historic (if legendary) precedent they "envisaged 
the death of the king” (Kabaka Mutesa in the original case).
Unifying versus conflictual is a division overlapping the two previous 
ones. Almost any right is in some circumstances and from some perspectives 
unifying. (Any genuine right genuinely prepounded aspires to universality 
which is a different point.) But in different contexts and from different 
perspectives almost any is conflictual. The right to an adequate diet 
in some contexts means restraints on landlords, money lenders, food merchants, 
tax collectors, etc - consider both the prophets in the Old Testament and 
medieval bourgeois laws on regrating, engrossing and forestalling for 
recognition of such conflict far older than and in different ideological 
traditions from Marxism. The right to free speech is equally conflictual 
in most contexts.
Pragmatic or principled tends to relate to the case put more than to the 
right considered. Milton's stirring defence of free speech in Aereopagitica 
was basically pragmatic - suppressing the false led to suppressing much 
of the true, in open debate the true would usually win out (and by true 
Milton meant normative Truth as well as objective fact). Similarly the 
Brandt Commission's case against mass poverty at global level is that the 
poor are poor producers, customers, payers and upholders of the peace.
But most ardent proponents either of freedom of speech or of the right 
to eat believe there is a normative as well as a pragmatic basis. Both 
Locke and Rawls tend in assuming a type of value calculus which is utilitarian 
in the narrow sense to cut themselves off from the way most real people 
live and act out value judgements or choices or struggles.
Immediately possible rights can - to some degree - be separated from those 
attainable only over time. However, which is which depends both on 
contexts and on perceptions. The right to an adequate diet is globally 
immediately possible on technical and real resource grounds albeit not on 
political commitment and power structure ones. (The same is true in India, 
the reverse in Tanzania and neither the technical/real resource nor political 
basis exists in Zaire.) Similarly the right to free speech is possible 
now - at a somewhat limited level - anywhere if the political cost is 
acceptable to those now in power but if it is read to mean the right to be 
able to communicate effectively to those interested in hearing it is not
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fully achieved anywhere because of very real technical, institutional 
and real resource constraints. Phased movement toward fuller exercise 
of rights is not unknown eg apertura in Brazil, Humphrey-Hawkins Act on 
employment in USA.
Dividing rights into legally enforceable and not legally enforceable 
has a tendency to be a debater's trick. If the definition of legally enforceable 
is that there is a law requiring or forbidding certain acts with sanctions 
for its violation, then to argue that an asserted right is not a right 
because no such law exists invites the answer "then pass an Act"! If the 
point at issue is actual enforcement (or protection of exercise) of the 
right this applies to almost every right in almost every country whatever 
legal protection it enjoys - the variations of degree are very wide but 
perfection is very rare. In any event protection/enforcement does not 
ultimately depend on statute law eg USA non-acceptance of Central American/ 
Caribbean refugees; Zimbabwean ending of segregated health/education 
facilities 18 months before acts requiring them were repealed.
New or synthesis is more a question than a dichotomy. Evidently numerous 
aspects of the right to development are embodied in more traditional 
rights. Whether all are is much less certain - the interaction of "packages" 
of rights may be catalytic and need to be seen as an interwoven whole 
(by no means a novel view in the civil rights tradition). Further the 
formulation of rights - even if not necessarily their basic nature - varies 
over time and space. The question about formulations (even if ultimately 
not about rights) is whether they are appropriate and useful not about 
whether they are "truly new" or regroup elements already contained in 
different formulations. A ground clearing that takes half a paper may seem 
one singularly inappropriate formulation! In the case of the right to 
development that may not be the case - both its proponents and opponents 
have managed to create vast clouds of smoke and sparks which prevent 
generation either of much light for those people who would wish to see 
or much heat for those human beings who are - literally - left "out in the 
cold" (or hot or wet or dry as the case may be).
Elements In An Operational Definition
The elements noted here have some claim to universality. However, they 
are formulated from the perspective (if not in the rather more concrete 
case and struggle oriented) vocabulary of the poor (or excluded, exploited 
and oppressed). This is deliberate as well as a concession to spatial 
limits. Rights need to be (and historically are) formulated primarily in 
terms of those whc need to enjoy them and are barred from doing so by
forces beyond their control. In the case of the right to development
those human beings, communities, sub-classes are primarily the poor even 
if, arguably, some of the rich are also constrained as well.
Six elements seem central:
a. participation (direct or indirect but in either case effective) 
in decision taking;
b. participation in enforcement of decisions (whether via the courts, 
elections or some form of withdrawal of support);
c. participation in production - to have a direct claim on its fruits
(and a direct power to reduce or halt it);
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d. effective access to basic individual/household consumer goods 
(including food, shelter, clothing, etc.) primarily from adequately 
productive and fairly remunerated employment/self employment;
e. effective access to basic public services - especially health, 
education, water;
f. ability to engage in self organisation to implement/enforce/protect 
the other elements of the right to development.
This bears a family resemblance to the ILO definition of Basic Needs - 
and more to its earlier draft on Basic Human Needs which proved politically 
unacceptable. It has little resemblance to minimum material needs 
approaches whether those with substantial platonic goodwill - eg Robert 
MacNamara's - or those which were overtly manipulative - eg Nero's bread 
and circuses.
It is apparently deceptive to most readers in two different respects. The 
first is as to its feasibility (at least over a twenty year period) on 
technical and real resource grounds - which is absolute globally and 
fairly high in all but a handful of states given moderate, targeted increases 
in real resource transfers. The second is in assuming that it is either 
politically easy or per se politically naive. A fairer criticism would be 
that it is politically explosive and may in many countries amount to a 
commitment to a course of struggle likely to lead to not insubstantial levels 
of violence.
Toward Programmatic Operationality
Any right can be defined generally/globally. Any programme at a concrete 
place, at a specific time to move toward making that right effective for 
particular communities of human beings and the individuals belonging to 
them will vary in verbal formulation, specific targets, priorities, sequences, 
tactics and time frame. Effective ability to communicate now usually 
requires building up "informal” or "open access" channels but to suppose 
the Village Voice and state/foundation funded open access time are relevant 
to Tanzanian villages is about as plausible as to think wall newspapers 
and meetings of all the residents together are relevant to Manhattan.
Some priority items of personal/household consumption are fully culturally 
bound - eg the minimum acceptable form of decent burial which in China and 
probably much of Africa would appear in the top five items most poor 
households would list as basic needs/rights to be secured. Others are more 
malleable but by no means either simply "objective" nor totally fluid eg an 
adequate diet is almost never defined by actual human beings (including one 
fancies nutritionists when eating) solely in terms of technical nutritional 
standards. Similarly the form and coding (as partially distinct from 
content) of free speech is often culture and context specific (eg "parliamentary 
language" is far from identical to normal standards of non-slanderous both 
as to inclusion and exclusion).
If one takes participation seriously, initial targets (and struggles and 
tactics) must turn in large part on how poor people and their groups 
perceive reality. This is not to claim that a leader should imitate a 
mirror perambulating down a highway nor to say that consciousness raising 
is merely a slogan for manipulation.' It is to say that a peasant community 
may and may validly see the initial barriers to an effective right to 
development as baboons eating their crops because they have no say in district
government and lack of pure water because central government allocations 
go only to towns. If so, to argue that the "real" problems are rich 
peasant exploitation of poor and World Bank lending patterns will not 
do much to further either peasant consciousness or concrete action - and 
is not consistent with the self determination strand in the right to 
development. (A strict Platonist whose model came from The Republic - like 
a reductionist Marxist - would not accept this because he does not accept 
problem identification and programme decisions as properly participatory 
by and of the poor rather than handled "for" them by Guardians - whether 
Platonic or Politbureaucratic.)
However, there are objective considerations. These overlap the previous 
category; the poor often do have better understanding of many objective 
realities confronting them than most of their unpoor champions. What the 
starting point is and what human, institutional, legal and real resource 
availabilities are must influence immediate targets, sequences and priorities. 
To propose air conditioners as a basic need of the poor in Africa need not 
be ill intentioned (highland Africans often find coastal climates more 
oppressive than Europeans) but it is either soft headed or wrong headed 
on objective limitation and priority grounds.
Further - while one hesitates to describe access to, exercise of and 
protection for a right as ever fully attained - the time needed to reach 
"full implementation" of rights must vary with starting points, costs of 
achieving them and resources available. To achieve freedom from malnutrition 
in Sweden is a shorter term goal than in the USA or - a fortiori - Upper 
Volta. To attain freedom of speech (in a functional not a formal sense) 
in Kenya is a longer term goal than in - say - Denmark with both Algeria 
and Tanzania arguably in between and Viet Nam even longer.
Toward Access and Enforceability
A right - if one accepts that rights have a normative base - does not 
cease to exist because it is violated even if the violation is legally 
allowed or enforced. Both apartheid and Amin's executions are seen as 
gross violations of rights - both have had the backing of law in their 
basic thrust if not in each individual case. However, in talking of 
rights except in the most abstracted or radical chic senses, it is necessary
to focus on human beings, singly and socially having effective access to
them and some means to enforce the continuation and expansion of that 
access to (enjoyment of) their rights.
In any particular case this probably should include (after at least 
broadly defining the nature of the right and the concrete embodiments of 
first steps toward making it effective) several steps:
a. identifying who already enjoys access to the right - individually, 
communally, as members of a sub-class (eg all members of this seminar 
presumably have effective access to the right to an adequate diet) -
and why they have that access as well as how secure it is;
b. identifying who does not have effective access (eg most "location" 
residents in Zambia, most refugees), why and how permanent the denial
is (in the two examples both the why and - perhaps - the how permanently 
questions have different answers);
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c. in the cases of those with access what powers to enforce the right 
(legally, politically, religiously, by social sanctions, economically) 
exist and how strong are they?
d. in the cases of those without effective access why do they not have 
(or conceivably have but do not use - probably a rare case) powers to 
enforce the right?
e. what routes, measures are in fact identifiable to deal with exclusion 
from access and power (possibly separable - Rwanda refugees in 
Tanzania have had access to basic services and self employment 
opportunities but their power to enforce them - citizenship - is 
both subsequent to enjoyment of access and a granted privilege 
rather than a right)?
f. What duties and what limitations (eg on the non-poor) need to be 
imposed to ensure effective and sustainable access for those who 
do not now enjoy it? How can these be structured to do the least 
harm to other rights and to have some chance of operationality?
Freedom to preach racism can deny any chance for effective equality 
of opportunity to minority communities and individuals and freedom 
to amass land can require near starvation of rural new landless but 
the ways of preventing either are varied and have quite varied 
impact on freedom of speech and freedom to enjoy the proceeds of 
ones labour (and to pursue ones occupation) more generally.
It is not always necessary to ask these questions - leaping into action 
is sometimes appropriate eg when massive violations of the right to life 
(whether from legal or paralegal execution or from starvation) are 
occurring or likely to occur unless deterrence is brought to bear. However, 
it is usually desireable to do so as a prelude to (not a substitute for) 
action. To ask the right questions - especially as to practicable means - 
is very often half way to finding the right answers and a quarter of the 
way to initial implementation.
Law and Enforceability
Law - at least statute law - is neither the only nor the ultimate source 
of enforeceability. This is probably particularly true of the right to 
development and of many aspects of it. The right not to starve has very 
considerable moral, emotional, cultural and - sometimes - political force 
but is very rarely (never?) legislated directly, nor indeed would it be 
made readily enforceable if it were.
Nor does law provide an inclusive or basic definition of rights even in 
principle. (In practice the correspondence is even less - legally 
validated rights are often flagrantly violated and rights on which there 
are no laws at all more widely enjoyed and honoured.) While a body of 
Law (as contrasted with individual laws) which is organically related to 
a society's values, practices, traditions, culture may influence how 
rights are perceived and enforced even if it is less than fully definitive 
(especially in periods when perceptions and/or power structures shift).
However, this is not the same thing as saying that in general law has no 
relationship with (or a negative relationship to) rights even though 
that may be true in some cases. Laws are often more than a simple 
recapitulation of what exists. They can play a target setting and norm 
presenting role as well as providing one avenue toward enforceability. How
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fully they can do this depends partly on how much change, how fast they 
require, how widely the norms embodied in them are accepted (including by 
those who violate them) and how many holders of how much power put what 
priority on enforcing them. The very different effectiveness of USA and 
UK anti-discrimination legislation relates in part to such considerations 
as well as to the very evident greater technical legal weaknesses of 
the UK legislation.
Law - broadly defined - has several roles in respect to establishing any 
right, the right to development included:
a. as an educational tool (in the hands of the would be beneficiaries
of the right);
b. as a defence mechanism (against those who violate the right protected
by existing law even when state initiated enforcement is unlikely
and the state is among the violaters who need to be restrained.
This is not so unreal a use as might be supposed - the tradition of 
the rechstadt has partial echoes surprisingly widely as eg some - even 
if not most - South African, Philippine and Indian cases suggest);
c. as a limitation on actions by the state or by other actors (either
because the state really does accept and will enforce the law or 
because it and other actors see a non-legal cost in breaking the law);
d. as a lever or pressure point (eg broad declarations on the right to 
development embodied in law may form a platform for criticizing 
actions/practices/resource allocations which frustrate their 
implementation);
e. as a tool for - and a defence of - self organisation and participation 
in respect not only of formal constitutional law but also of adminis­
trative law (including general regulations whatever their formal status) and 
of the organisational embodiment and self defence of groups seeking
access to the right to development.
f. as a means of imposing a sanction (cost) or erecting an injunction 
(barrier surmountable only at a cost) against a violater of some 
embodiment or aspect of a right.
The basic problems with the use of law in these ways are at least fourfold:
a. access to the law - both intellectual and financial - is often easiest 
for those who already enjoy effective rights and/or wish to deny them 
to others;
b. use of laws to bind a state which does not in practice agree with them 
has distinct limitations beyond individual cases or secondary issues - 
ie one can hope to gain a few degrees of freedom sometimes but not 
challenge the basic interests of dominant decision takers who will 
ultimately respond by coercing the courts/lawyers or changing the law;
c. laws in a broad - and sometimes loose - way do represent the values, 
goals and interests of those (individuals, sub-classes, corporate bodies) 
in power whereas the right to development is primarily concerned with 
altering access to - inter alia - power and therefore requires changes
in the laws before it can depend on their enforcement as a generally 
positive force;
d. the majority of lawyers in most countries (including judges) are 
not poor and do - personally and as a profession or sub-class - have 
fairly effective access to the right to development. Thus both "what
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we have we hold" and "invisibility" (or non-comprehension of) the 
poor and their assertion of a right to development are more often the 
rule than the exception in legal circles.
None is either absolute or insoluble. Collectively they can be formidable. 
However, considerations b and c, once portions of the right to development 
have adequate power bases to have been enacted as law and to have substantial 
institutional/political backing,begin to operate in the inverse (pro-right 
to development) way. At that point the last problem may become lesser - 
with a more diversified group of entrants into the legal and paralegal 
professions - or greater with lawyers the guardians of the last ditch 
against more effective access to the right to development whatever lawmakers 
and the poor may say or legislate. It is not accidental that revolutions 
fairly generally take a dim view of individual lawers, judges and laws; 
not uncommonly of the existing legal profession and legal system as a whole 
and sometimes of the rule and role of law generally. Not accidental, but 
not desireable either since laws and especially Law are among the least 
bad/least ineffective ways of creating and maintaining institutional and 
procedural frameworks within which effective access to all rights (including 
the right to development) could be enjoyed.
Draft - to be revised prior to publication. May be cited but not 
directly quoted without reference to the author.
